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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The respondent adopts the statement of the kind of 
case involved in this appeal as stated in the appellant's 
brief. It is a will contest. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
and 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
As stated by appellant, the lower court granted re-
spondent's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion 
of appellant's evidence, all parties resting at that time, 
and appellant now seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
order and judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The rules of this court require an appellant to make 
a complete statement of the material facts involved in the 
record on appeal, not merely as the appellant contends 
them to be, but viewing them as they must be on appeal, 
favorable to the judgment of the lower court. 
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is so 
shockingly lacking in completeness and is so unfair in 
presentation that respondents are compelled to set forth 
a complete statement of facts. 
The record in this case consists of the testimony and 
exhibits introduced by appellant. Respondents did not 
call a single witness or offer a single exhibit. It must be 
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assumed, therefore, that appellant pre~ented the strongest 
case which he was able to present. At the conclusion of 
appellant's case it was so apparent to the trial court that 
appellant had failed to make a prima facie case, that when 
respondents also rested and moved for a directed verdict 
the motion was granted. The record fully and completely 
supports the trial court's action in granting that motion. 
Margaret Holten was an ambitious and hard-work-
ing woman. In some manner not entirely made clear in 
this record, she accumulated or came into the possession 
of some means which enabled her to go into the real es-
tate and investment business. By shrewd, careful, and 
frugal management, she gradually accumulated money 
and property until at the time of her death her wealth 
had become considerable. 
Margaret Holten was the mother of a feebleminded 
son whom she called "Buddy." After his birth her hus-
band deserted her. Margaret Holten cared for Buddy 
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in her home for twenty-six years until his death in the 
spring of 1956. (R. 94) 
Margaret Holten had very little contact with her 
brother, Paul Schramm, the contestant herein; his wife or 
two children, Byran Paul Schramm and Mary Schramm 
Ashworth. Paul Schramm moved to California in 1909. 
(R. 75) From that time to the date of her death, 
Margaret Holten periodically visited Paul Schramm in 
California. (R. 78) 
In 1956, Margaret Holten visited with Paul Schramm 
at the time of the dedication of the L. D. S. Temple in 
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Los Angeles. (R. 81) At this time Byran Paul Schramm 
discussed with her business affairs and various stocks 
which they both owned. They also discussed an off er to 
purchase which Margaret Holten had received on a piece 
of property near the Sears, Roebuck store in Salt Lake 
City. (R. 120-21) 
In July 1957, Margaret Holten again visited with 
Paul Schramm in Los Angeles. At this time th_ey dis-
cussed some of the trust deeds which Margaret Holten 
owned. (R. 108) 
After the July 1957 visit, it was not until July 1960, 
nine months after the execution of the holographic will, 
that Paul Schramm or his children had any personal con-
tact with Margaret Holten. (R. 96, 100) During this 
time, Margaret Holten corresponded with Paul 
Schramm's wife. Paul Schramm noticed nothing in any 
of this correspondence which was unusual or different. 
(R. 75-76) 
In July 1960, Paul Schramm's wife died. Margaret 
Holten traveled to California by bus to attend the 
funeral. (R. 113-14) At this time Paul Schramm no-
ticed that Margaret Holten could not talk without stut-
tering. (R. 79) He observed that Margaret Holten 
refused to lie down or go to bed, but sat up in bed until 
3 :00 o'clock in the morning with the light on. (R. 80) 
Although Margaret Holten had difficulty with her speech 
at this time, she understood perfectly what Paul 
Schramm and his children said to her. (R. 109, 118) 
At this time Paul Schramm did not attempt to con-
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tact a physician to check Margaret Holten's physical con-
dition. (R. 98) After the funeral Paul Schramm put her 
on the bus and sent her home alone. Subsequently, she 
sent a postcard and told Paul Schramm that she had ar-
rived safely. (R. 98) 
Neither Paul Schramm nor his children gave any 
opinion as to the testamentary capacity of Margaret Hol-
ten, nor did they know of any person who exercised un-
due influence or was even present at the time the 
holographic will was executed by Margaret Holten. (R. 
109, 117, 127-28) 
Margaret Holten had a close and intimate relation-
ship with Pauline Hamilton from 1946 or '47 until shortly 
before her death. (R. 207) Margaret Holten taught Mrs. 
Hamilton and got her into the business of buying and 
dealing in real estate contracts. (R. 206) Mrs. Hamilton 
1 expressed the opinion that Margaret Holten was a very 
competent business woman and that there was never a 
time when she was unable to take care of her business 
' affairs. (R. 207) 
During the course of the close association, Margaret 
Holten told Pauline Hamilton how she wanted to dispose 
of her property at her death. Testatrix told Mrs. Hamil-
ton on many occasions that she was going to give her 
property to the L.D.S. Church. After Buddy died in 
the spring of 1956, these conversations began and con-
tinued over the next few years, a substantial time before 
the execution of the formal will, dated February 18, 1959, 
and the holographic will, dated October 13, 1959. (R. 197, 
200-202, 207) 
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Margaret Holten also especially indicated during 
this period that she did not want her brother, Paul 
Schramm, to have any of her property. Mrs. Holten had 
stated that her brother had never done anything for her 
or helped support her mother. (R. 196-97) Margaret 
Holten had talked to her brother about the care of 
Buddy if anything ever happened to her and she was 
unable to care for him. He told her that he would have 
nothing to do with his care. (R. 200) 
Although Margeret Holten was an able and com-
petent business woman, she was eccentric, irritable and 
somewhat of a crank. On one occasion a child of her 
neighbor, Mr. Morris, came on her property with a dog. 
Mrs. Holten came out of her house with a butcher knife 
swearing and chased the child off her property. (R. 156) 
She frequently swore at her neighbors. (R. 157) She 
called the police one time when Mr. Morris went on her 
property to remove her garbage. (R. 158) In an alter-
cation with another neighbor, Mr. Atkin, she called the 
police and had him arrested. (R. 190-91) On one occa-
sion Margaret Holten yelled at Mr. Atkin and told him 
that she hated him and that nobody liked him and that 
he was "ugly and sour". (R. 193) 
Dr. Joyce Henrie, a psychiatrist, from an examination 
of Margaret Holten's diary, testified that Margaret Holten 
was a "chronic paranoid personality, bordering at times 
on a paranoid reaction." (R. 164) 
Dr. Henrie stated: 
"You would describe a chronic paranoid per-
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sonality as ... by the lay people more described 
as a crank or an eccentric, someone who is always 
irritable and quarrelsome." (R. 165) 
Notwithstanding Dr. Henrie's opinion that Margaret 
Holten was a chronic paranoid personality, she testified 
that she was mentally competent: 
"Q. . . . Now, doesn't this diary show evidence 
that Margaret Holton knew who her family 
was? 
"A. I said 'Yes.' 
"Q. And doesn't the diary show that she knew 
what her property consisted of? 
"THE COURT: Mr. Bowen, I don't think this 
doctor has ever said that the lady lacked mental 
capacity. 
"A. I certainly did not. 
"Q. You have not said that? 
"A. Certainly not. I have not inferred it. We 
haven't even discussed that." (R. 178) 
Dr. Henrie also testified that Margaret Holten might 
be more susceptible to religious influence than other 
people. (R. 172-73) In further explanation she stated: 
"THE COURT: Would there be anything to 
her tendency to belligerency that would cause 
her to rebel against anyone trying to influence 
her, whether religious or not? 
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"A. She would be very prone to develop-to 
rebel toward people, but if the religion-the power 
as such were portrayed to her in a way that was 
convincing, I doubt that she would rebel toward 
that. 
"THE COURT: Thank you. 
"Q. Doctor, would she be less inclined to 
rebel against people who represent the power 
you just described? 
"A. I think Mrs. Holten would rebel toward 
almost any person from what I have seen of her 
diary, irregardless of their affiliation." 
Dr. Henrie further stated that there was no entry in 
the diary that would support a conclusion that Margaret 
Holten was prevailed upon by anybody to write the will 
in question. (R. 183) The entries in the diary would in-
dicate that in February, 1959, she was capable of knowing 
that she was drawing a will and that she was capable of 
knowing her property and heirs. (R. 183) Dr. Henrie 
also stated that when the holographic will was written by 
Mrs. Holten the will itself indicated that she was in con-
trol of her decision as to whom she wanted as her executor 
because she made a change. (R. 185) 
In 1959 Margaret Holten first met Bishop Buehner. 
She had gone to the Church offices to see one of the gen-
eral authorities of the L.D.S. Church. Since Bishop 
Buehner was available he talked with her. Margaret Hol-
ten had come to discuss a problem with a neighbor who 
was encroaching on her property. (R. 148-49) 
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The second time they met was uneventful. Margaret 
Holten had only dropped in to Bishop Buehner's office 
to pass the time of day. (R. 149) 
The third time she contacted Bishop Buehner at his 
office, she mentioned her impending hysterectomy 
operation, her invalid son and how she loved him, and 
that her husband had deserted her twenty-five or some 
years earlier. She told Bishop Buehner that she had a 
brother whom she hardly ever heard from, that she had 
worked hard in the real estate business, and that she had 
acquired a little property. She told him that she had de-
cided to leave her property to the L.D.S. Church. (R. 
149-50) 
Upon learning of Margaret Holten's desire to leave 
her property to the Church and ascertaining that she had 
an interest in genealogy, he suggested that she might 
leave her property to the Genealogical Society of the 
L.D.S. Church. At no time did Buehner ask Margaret 
Holten to will her property to the Church or try to per-
suade her to make the Genealogical Society the vehicle 
for the accomplishment of her purpose. (R. 150) 
With this background, Margaret Holten requested 
Bishop Buehner to arrange to have the Church's legal 
, counsel draft a will for her. (R. 152) Buehner introduced 
. her to Vernon Snyder. The introduction was brief. 
Buehner merely told Snyder that Mrs. Holten had 
requested him to ask Snyder to prepare a will and would 
he do so. After this introduction Buehner had nothing 
whatever to do with the preparation of the will. (R. 152, 
153) He never saw the will nor discussed it further with 
10 
Snyder. He was unaware that it provided for him to be 
the executor. (R 141-43) 
Mrs. Holten told Snyder what she wanted in her 
will and he prepared it as she directed. She specifically 
instructed him to provide that her property was to go to 
the Church. She also repeated what she had told Buehner; 
namely, she gave Snyder her brother's name, told him 
that she had a deceased son, that her husband had de-
serted her many years before, and that she did not want 
her brother to have her property. (R. 141-43) 
A few days later, after the will was prepared, Mar-
garet Holten came back to Mr. Snyder's office. The will 
was read aloud and she expressed satisfaction that the 
will was as she desired. (R. 134) After the will was ex-
ecuted on February 18, 1959, Snyder kept the document 
until the testatrix came and asked for it some time later. 
(R. 13 6) After this time Snyder never saw the will again 
and only saw Mrs. Holten a couple of times on the street. 
(R. 137-38) After February 18, 1959, neither Buehner 
nor Snyder discussed the subject of a will with Margaret 
Holten. (R. 137, 141-43) 
On October 13, 1959, nearly eight months later, 
Margaret Holten wrote the will now under attack in her 
own handwriting. (Ex. C-7) The dispositive provisions 
of the holographic will were the same as the first will. 
However, in the holographic will, Margaret Holten had 
changed the executor from Bishop Buehner to the Tracy-
Collins Bank & Trust Company. There is no evidence in 
the record as to who was present or the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the holographic will. The 
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appellant frankly admits this in his brief. (p. 2) Mr. 
Snyder did not know that she had written the second will 
(R. 142); and neither did Bishop Buehner. (R. 152) 
The holographic will was found by the appellant and his 
children in a locked steel cabinet on Margaret Holten's 
porch two or three days after her death. (R. 87, 89) 
On September 28, 1960, a year after the holographic 
will was executed, Margaret Holten consulted Dr. D. C. 
~ Bernson, a neurosurgeon, with a complaint of headaches 
and dizziness. (R. 210, 211) The consultation occurred 
in Dr. Bernson's office at which place Mrs. Holten pre-
sented herself unaided and unassisted. ( R. 218, 219) At 
this time she knew that she was to see the doctor and gave 
the usual personal and medical information to Dr. Bern-
son's secretary, including the fact that she had a brother, 
Paul. (R. 218-219) 
Dr. Bernson's tentative diagnosis of her difficulty 
was "some sort of mass, tumor or hematoma, or blood 
clot". (R. 213) He recommended that Mrs. Holten be 
hospitalized for further tests and diagnosis. This recom-
' mendation she refused to accept. Two months after his 
initial examination, Dr. Bernson wrote a letter to Mrs. 
Holten advising her of the seriousness of her situation and 
again recommending hospitalization. (R. 213) 
In October, 1962, two years after Dr. Bernson's ini-
tial examination, a non-malignant tumor the size of a base-
ball was removed from Margaret Holten's skull. (Ex. C-3) 
The tumor was exceedingly slow-growing and was prob-
ably present for a long period of time, possibly six or seven 
years. It was located on the left side and involved the 
12 
temporal parietal areas which would affect the patient's 
memory. (R. 216-17) Dr. Bernson further testified that 
although he felt that this brain tumor had been present 
for a long time it would be difficult and largely conjec-
ture to estimate how long it had been growing, and 
further, that it would be impossible to state with any cer-
tainty when the size of the tumor became such that it 
would affect her ability to know and understand what her 
business was, who her relatives were, or would interfere 
with her ability to make or formulate a plan of disposing 
of her estate. (R. 219-20) 
On the basis of his examination of Margaret Holten 
md the hospital records, Dr. Bernson was unable to tes-
tify that on October 13, 1959, when she executed the 
holographic will, that she was mentally incompetent. 
(R. 220 ) However, in response to a hypothetical ques-
tion, Dr. Bernson did state that: 
"If she was able to collect moneys and keep 
track of sums and additions and handle this sort 
of thing, I would-in my opinion I would say I 
think she was probably mentally competent at 
that time." (R. 223) 
ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PROPER AND 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
Appellant's contention that he was entitled to have 
this case submitted to a jury is founded upon the argu· 
ment that the evidence submitted by plaintiff created 
a presumption of testamentary incapacity and undue in-
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fluence in the execution of testatrix's last will and testa-
ment. It is certainly clearly and unmistakably admitted 
by him that the record does not contain any direct, posi-
tive, or clear evidence on either of these propositions. 
On page 2 of his brief, appellant concedes that there 
is no evidence as to where, or the circumstances under 
which, decedent's last will was written. There is no evi-
dence that when this will, made on October 13, 1959 
(Ex. C-7), was written, any person had any knowledge 
concerning it other than testatrix herself. There is no 
evidence in the record that Margaret Holten lacked 
testamentary capacity at that time, or that at that time she 
acted under a delusion, paranoid reaction, or other ab-
normal mental condition. Neither is there the slightest 
evidence that on that day, or any day near said date, any 
person connected with the L.D.S. Church or the Genea-
logical Society influenced testator in any way or made 
suggestions to her as to how she should write her will. 
Appellant cites a decision of this court which lays 
down the rules by which testamentary capacity and un-
due influence are to be determined. The case of In Re 
George's Estate, 100 Utah 230, 112 P2d 498 (1941) 
cited by appellant in his brief, holds that there must be 
proof of facts which show that at the time the will was 
signed there was such pressure being exerted upon the 
mind of the testator that his volition was overpowered 
by it. 
That case also holds that merely because the testator 
is old and weak and is emotionally unstable; that his will 
made two of his children his sole beneficiaries to the ex-
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clusion of his other children; that one of the beneficiaries 
was instrumental in getting counsel to prepare and sub-
scribing witnesses to witness the will; that the two bene-
ficiaries named in the will had been in close association 
with the testator and had already received much prop-
erty from him by way of gifts, and that his other children 
had been almost entirely excluded from association with 
him, was not enough to support a finding of undue in-
fluence of mental incompetency. 
II THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT TEST ATRIX'S HOLOGRAPHIC 
WILL WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF UNDUE 
INFLUENCE 
Almost all of appellant's brief is devoted to an at-
tack upon a document which is not the testatrix's last will 
and testament at all. The circumstances surrounding the 
execution of that document are not even relevant to the 
issues of this case. 
Appellant directs his main argument against a prior 
will of Margaret Holten written over seven months before 
her last will was executed. Appellant claims that be-
cause the testatrix executed a will on February 18, 1959, 
leaving the bulk of her estate to the Genealogical Society 
after consulting with Bishop Carl Buehner, at that time 
one of the general authorities of the L.D.S. Church, and 
after that document had been prepared by the Church's 
legal counsel at decendent's request, a prima facie case 
of undue influence was established against her last will, 
which presumption must remain until rebutted by the 
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respondents even though there is no evidence that either 
Buehner or said legal counsel were in any way connected 
with the preparation or signing of the last will. The only 
basis for such claim is that the two documents are similar 
in that they give to appellant only a nominal amount and 
the bulk of decedent's estate to the Genealogical Society 
of the L.D.S. Church. Because of this similarity, it is ar-
gued that the latter document must have been copied from 
the earlier one and therefore all of the alleged infirmities 
of the prior will automatically attach themselves to the 
last will. Appellant also argues that testatrix was abnor-
mal mentally by reason of afflictions of body and mind 
and psychotic tendencies and was susceptible to sug-
gestions and influence because of her peculiar religious 
beliefs. 
Respondent submits that the argument of appellant 
rests not upon evidence but upon speculation, inference, 
and innuendo and upon the conclusions of a person who 
never saw the deceased. Furthermore, respondent sub-
mits that the testimony of the witnesses, upon whom ap-
pellant relies so heavily, does not support appellant's 
position and that the distorted, unrealistic picture 
painted by appellant's brief will not stand up under criti-
cal examination. 
Margaret Holten was not a pathetic, defenseless old 
woman pictured by appellant as hopelessly unable to 
manage her affairs and decide upon the disposition of 
her property by will. The facts are that she was a woman 
of unusual competence in business affairs who, for over 
thirty years, alone and unassisted by anyone, built up a 
sizeable estate that would have been a credit to the most 
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accomplished, shrewd and able businessman. The record 
of her activities and accomplishments at the very time 
when this will was made is a complete answer to the un-
supported claims of appellant. The following is quoted 
from the testimony of Pauline Hamilton, called by the 
appellant to be a witness and by whose testimony he is 
bound. Pauline Hamilton knew and associated with the 
testatrix for over thirty years. (R. 195) Pauline Hamil-
ton's business association with Margaret Holten lasted 
from 1946 or 1947 until the time of decedent's death. She 
testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you ever find-did you come to any 
conclusion about whether Margaret Holten was 
a competent business woman? 
"A. Well, I considered her very competent al-
though very ruthless. 
"Q. Now, Mrs. Hamilton, over what period 
of time did these business associations with Mar-
garet Holton last? 
"A. Well, until shortly before she died. 
"Q. And when-
"A. From about 1946 or '47. 
"Q. Was there any time that you ever observed 
her when she was unable to take care of het 
business affairs? 
"A. There was never a time she didn't take care 
of her business. That came first." (R. 207) 
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Appellant called no other witness who had known 
and associated with Margaret Schramm Holten inti-
mately or frequently during the last years of her life. Both 
Viola Parkinsort and Adele Bird, who had known Mar-
garet Holten very well over a long period of time, were in 
court under appellant's subpoena during the trial but 
neither was ever called to testify. He called Mr. Atkin 
and Mr. Morris, neighbors of the deceased who were un-
able to get along with her. Neither of them gave any 
testimony even remotely tending to prove undue influ-
ence in connection with decedent's last will or proving 
her to be mentally incompetent. Their testimony was 
confined to the incidents of testatrix's sometimes un-
reasonable conduct toward them and members of their 
families. 
Nor did appellant or his son or daughter, who also 
testified, provide any support to his claim of undue in-
fluence or testamentary incapacity. They all ac-
knowledged that they had no proof of such influence 
ever having been exerted upon testatrix in connection 
with her last will. (R. 109, '117, 127-28) 
This leaves Dr. Henrie and Dr. Bernson who were 
the only other witnesses who testified. On the subject 
of undue influence, Dr. Henrie stated that she had noth-
ing whatsoever to offer. (R. 181, 183, 185) All that Dr. 
Henrie' said was that in her opinion Margaret Holten, as 
revealed by the writing in her diary, was a person sus-
ceptible of being influenced by religious considerations. 
She stated that she had absolutely no opinion that this 
susceptibility had been used and worked upon by anyone 
at the time testatrix's last will was written and executed. 
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Dr. Bernson was not even asked to testify on the subject 
of undue influence. 
In view of the foregoing state of the record, it is a 
gross overstatement for counsel to say that his claim of 
undue influence rests upon a presumption. 
III UNDUE INFLUENCE, THOUGH PROVEN, EX-
ERCISED IN CONNECTION WITH A PRIOR 
WILL WILL NOT INVALIDATE A LATER WILL 
UNLESS THAT UNDUE INFLUENCE IS CON-
NECTED WITH THE LATER WILL BY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE 
The law is clear with respect to the evidentiary ef-
fect of undue influence used in connection with a prior 
will upon a later will. The cases uniformly hold that if a 
will has been secured by undue influence and thereafter 
at a later date a new will is executed which confirms the 
first will or which contains the same provisions of the 
first will with respect to bequests or devises, the effect 
of the undue influence in connection with the first will 
is nullified, unless it can be shown by competent evidence 
that the same undue influence procured the execution 
of the later will or codicil. 
In re Welch's Estate, 272 P.2d 512 (Cal. 1954), 
the court said the following at pages 516-17: 
«Almost two years after execution of the will, 
Myrtle added a handwritten codicil to her hand-
written will, on the same paper, merely appoint-
ing Arthur as executor. Manifestly the testamen-
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tary disposition of her property was then drawn 
to her attention, and yet Myrtle did not elect to 
make any change. While Geraldine argues that 
Arthur's conduct upon moving into Myrtle's home 
following the death of Myrtle's husband operated 
to coerce Myrtle into making the will in question 
over three weeks later, there was no semblance of 
a showing of any pressure or overpowering activ-
ity on his part at or near the time of her execution 
of the codicil. The latter act had the effect of 
reexecution of the will and removed any possible 
taint of undue influence which might be argued 
with respect to its original procurement. 
"At most, the record here shows no more than 
that Arthur was so situated as to have had an op-
portunity to unduly influence the mind of Myrtle, 
and that his actions and conduct at times might be 
regarded as suspicious; but to say that from such 
evidence it may be found that Arthur 'overpow-
ered the mind and bore down the volition of the 
[testatrix] at the very time the will was made' 
would be to permit Myrtle's will to be overturned 
not upon proof but upon speculation. In re Es-
tate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765; 130 P. 872. 
Moreover, the final testamentary act in question 
was Myrtle's execution of the holographic codi-
cil republishing her will, and as to which there 
was not the slightest basis for finding that it was 
the product of undue influence by Arthur." 
In Taft v. Stearns, 125 N.E. 570 (Mass., 1920), the 
court said at pages 571-72: 
"A will as modified by a codicil 1s thereafter 
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to be taken and construed as a will of the date of 
the codicil. Pratt v. Rice, 7 Cush. 209, 212. 
"This principle is applicable to an instrument 
executed in form as a will, but inoperative as 
such because executed through fraud or undue 
influence, which is referred to as a will in a codicil 
subsequently executed freely, unaffected by 
fraud or undue influence. There is no reason why 
such a will, although invalid when framed be-
cause the result of the overpowering importunity 
of another, may not be adopted and declared as 
a true expression of testamentary desires after 
the vitiating control of the other dominating mind 
has been removed or has faded or subsided. 
* * * * * 
"The result is that, the answer of the jury 
having established the codicil as the free and un-
trammeled expression of the testamentary pur-
pose of the deceased, and the will having been af-
firmed and republished by the codicil, both in-
struments should be admitted to probate." 
In re George's Estate, 100 Utah 230; 112 P. 2d 498 
(1941), this court said at page 503: 
"Assuming that the father was dissatisfied with 
what he had done by those deeds, plenty of time 
had elapsed for him to have changed his mind, and 
to have concluded that the transfers were what 
he desired after all." 
See also, In re Baird's Estate, 168 P. 561, 176 Cal. 381 
(1917) and Warren v. Sanders, 287 S.W. 2d 146 (Ky., 
1946). These cases illustrate the absurdity of claiming that 
21 
a presumption of undue influence in connection with an 
earlier will continues into the execution of a later will un-
til it has been rebutted. 
IV THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WILL NOT 
SUPPORT A PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE 
With this background respondents now desire to 
address themselves to the contention of appellant that 
there was undue influence in the execution of Margaret 
Holten's will dated February 18, 1959. 
We have already pointed out that there is no direct 
evidence in the record which even remotely supports 
appellant's proposition. Appellant's argument is based 
entirely upon the fact that the testatrix had talked with 
Bishop Buehner and had asked him to arrange to have the 
attorney for the Church draw her will. 
V THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A PRE-
SUMPTION THAT BISHOP BUEHNER USED 
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN CONNECTION WITH 
TEST ATRIX'S LAST WILL AND TEST AMENT 
The facts were uncontradicted that Mrs. Holten 
sought out Bishop Buehner in the first instance. It was 
she who opened the discussion about her will and what 
she desired to do with her property and who stated that 
she wanted to give it to the Church. (R. 148-52) Sub-
stantially the same thing occurred in her conversations 
with Vernon Snyder. (R. 129-37, 141-44) 
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None of this testimony contains any evidence of un-
due influence having been used by either Bishop Bueh-
ner or Vernon Snyder, but it is argued this need not be 
shown because the relationship of the parties created a 
presumption of undue influence. It is true that in many 
instances where a bequest of money is made to a person, 
in some confidential or fiduciary relationship with the 
testator, who influences the making of a will in his favor, 
a presumption of undue influence will arise provided it 
appears that such gift was made under circumstances 
which show that the gift would not have been made ex-
cept for the importuning of the donee and that such 
importuning overpowered the will of the testator, and 
either forced or improperly induced the making of the 
gift. (In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d. 277, 293 P2d 692) 
However, even in such cases, it is held that mere sugges-
tion or request made to the testator is not undue 
influence. 
In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P2d 602 
(1933) the court declared at page 410: 
"* * >:· The most that can be said is that dur-
ing the few minutes he was alone with the testa-
tor, he, notwithstanding his testimony to the con-
trary, may have suggested a disposition of the 
testator's property to the school over which he 
presided. Undue influence must be proved. It 
will not be presumed from mere interest or op-
portunity. The opportunity to exercise influence, 
unless combined with circumstances tending to 
show its exercise, affords no presumption that it 
was in fact exercised." (Emphasis added) 
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Furthermore, the law is that there must be more than 
a showing of opportunity or desire to exercise undue in-
fluence. It must be actually exercised. In re Hanson's 
Will, 50 Utah 207, 221, 167 P. 256 (1917); In re Bryan's 
Estate, supra, at page 410; Clark v. Johnson, 105 S.W. 2d 
576, 268 Ky. 591 ( 1937). 
Also, before a presumption of undue influence arises, 
the donee must have secured some direct benefit for him-
self under the will or for someone close to him in order 
for undue influence to vitiate a will. In re Bryan's Estate, 
supra, p. 410: 
Prior to the making of the will, there had never 
been between them any confidence in the na-
ture of confession or administration of sacra-
ments. Father Kennedy was not a beneficiary of 
the will. Adams v. First Methodist Episcopal 
Church, 251 Ill. 268, 96 N.E. 253." 
In the Adams case referred to above, cited by the 
court, the testatrix left all of her estate to the 
Methodist Episcopal Church. Her brother and sister at-
tacked the will on grounds of mental incapacity and un-
due influence. The jury upheld the will which was 
affirmed on appeal. The Illinois court stated, on page 256: 
"It is argued that there was a confidential re-
lation existing between the testatrix and the 
pastor and trustees of the church. Such a relation 
exists between a priest or spiritual adviser and 
his parishioner (Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 Ill. 480, 
68 N.E. 56; Gilmore v. Less, 237 Ill. 402, 86 N.E. 
568, 127 Am. St. Rep. 330), and, if the priest or 
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spiritual adviser receives a gift from the parish-
ioner, the burden is upon him to show the ab-
sence of undue influence, but the pastor has no 
financial interest in the church or the church 
property, and in this case the will conferred no 
benefit upon the pastor." 
In Gilmore v. Atwell, 283 S.W. 2d 636 (Mo., 1955), 
the court, on page 641, quotes from Vol. 2 of Page, Wills, 
Section 840, p. 655, as follows: 
"No presumption of undue influence arises 
where a testator makes a gift for religious pur-
poses with which the spiritual advisor of such 
testator is closely connected." 
The court further stated, on page 642: 
"Under the proponents' cases, including the 
majority holding of court en bane in Tibbe v. 
Kamp, supra, in the light of the change effected 
in the law by Leohr v. Starke, supra, an inference 
of undue influence did not arise from the clergy-
man's activities in connection with his communi-
cant's will, the Church, and not the clergyman, 
being the beneficiary." 
See also, Daugherty v. State Savings, Loan f5 Trust 
Co., 126 N.E. 545, 292 Ill. 147 (1920), in which the court 
stated on page 547: 
"* * * The only basis, if it can be said to be a 
basis at all, to support the claim of undue influ-
ence is that S. B. Montgomery, who drew the 
will, was a stockholder and officer of the bank-
ing institution made trustee and executor, and an 
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officer of the Blessing Hospital board. So far as 
the proof shows, the testator went alone, on his 
own suggestion, to the bank and asked Mont-
gomery to draw his will. Montgomery did so in a 
back room of the bank, and when it was completed 
two employees of the bank were called into the 
room and testator told them the document was 
his will, and asked them to sign as witnesses, 
which they did. There is no proof that Montgom-
ery ever advised or suggested the making of the 
will or any of its provisions, and the mere fact 
that institutions in which he was interested re-
ceived substantial benefits from the will, under 
all the authorities, does not support the claim 
of undue influence." (Emphasis added) 
See also, In re Fletcher's Estate, 269 P.2d 349 (Okla., 
1954) and In re Conway's Estate, 79 A 2d 208, 366 Pa. 
641 ( 1951). 
Measured by these standards, where does the record 
leave the appellant with respect to Bishop Buehner"s 
connection with Margaret Holten's earlier will? First 
of all, there was no competent evidence produced by 
appellant which will support a finding that any confi-
dential relationship existed between Bishop Buehner 
and the deceased. He was not her confidential business 
or spiritual advisor. She had never consulted him about 
how she should dispose of he·r property by will. She 
came to him with her mind already made up to give 
her property to the Church or one of its related institu-
tions. The only question discussed between Bishop 
Buehner and decedent was which of the Church's insti-
tutions would best accomplish the purpose she had ill 
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mind. On one occasion she asked for assistance in the 
settlement of a disagreement with a neighbor, and once, 
when she was sick, deceased requested the Bishop to 
give her a blessing. These two instances did not make 
Bishop Buehner Margaret Holten's spiritual advisor. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence at all to suggest any 
contention that Bishop Buehner was acting as the spirit-
ual advisor of deceased on October 13, 1959; the record 
is the exact opposite of such situation. The record con-
sistently shows the exact opposite of such contention. 
In Newell v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 250 P. 96 
(1926), cited by appellant in his brief, the court stated 
at page 414: 
"* * * Mere confidence in one person by 
another is not sufficient alone to constitute a fidu-
ciary relationship. The confidence must be 
reposed by one under such circumstances as to 
create a corresponding duty, either legal or 
moral, upon the part of the other to observe the 
confidence, and it must result in a situation where 
as a matter of fact there is superior influence on 
one side and dependence on the other." 
There simply cannot be a finding that Buehner 
was guilty of undue influence based upon the evidence 
in the record. The evidence does not show that Buehner 
suggested in any way that Margaret Holten leave her 
estate to the Church or to its Genealogical Society. The 
record is the exact reverse. It is granted that Bishop 
Buehner was in a position to urge Margaret Holten to 
leave her property to the Society, but he did not do so, 
·and, as pointed out, mere opportunity to exercise undue 
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influence is not enough; it must be actually shown to have 
been used. Furthermore, this earlier will created no 
personal benefit for Buehner. He got nothing for him-
self either directly or indirectly by its terms. The fine-
spun, tenuous, and wholly unsupported claim of appellant 
that Buehner, because he was a general authority of the 
L.D.S. Church and may have received some intangible 
benefit from the will of Margaret Holten, is without 
merit. There are many cases where wills have left prop-
erty to religious or charitable organizations at the sug-
gestion of a priest or pastor or other religious figure or 
person in charge of such institution where it has been 
held that such connection between such institutions and 
its pastor, priest, or other person in control at the time a 
will is made is immaterial. In re Bryan's Estate, supra, 
at p. 411; In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, at p. 219, 
167 P. 256 ( 1917); Clark v. Johnson, 105 S.W. 2d 576 
(Ky, 1937); Gilmore v. Atwell, supra; Daugherty v. 
State Savings Loan f5 Trust Co., supra; and In re Con-
way's Estate, supra. 
VI THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A PRE-
SUMPTION THAT VERNON SNYDER USED 
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN CONNECTION WITH 
TEST ATRIX'S LAST WILL AND TEST AMENT. 
The same rules and tests that apply to Buehner's 
conduct with respect to Margaret Holten's earlier will 
also apply to Vernon Snyder, at that time legal counsel 
for the L.D.S. Church. There is, however, one additional 
factor in the case of Snyder. He was legal counsel for 
~8 
the Church and its various organizations. In acting in 
the preparation of Mrs. Holten's will, he was in a position 
of trust and confidence. Would the fact that he operated 
in this dual capacity create a presumption of undue in-
fluence with respect to this earlier will? Respondent 
claims that the record entirely supports its conten-
tion that there was no evidence of undue influence. 
There is no evidence that Snyder violated any confiden-
tial relationship with Margaret Holten. He got no bene-
fit from this earlier will. His position as scrivener of 
this will is not even remotely close to the situation in-
volving McFarlane in the case of In Re Swan's Estate, 
supra. 
But assuming that there may be some room for ar-
guing that a presumption of undue influence arose be-
cause Snyder was the scrivener with respect to Margaret 
Holten's earlier will, there is positive evidence in this 
record which utterly, effectively, and completely de-
stroys it. In the first place, the will of February 18, 1959, 
which counsel so vigorously argues is tainted by undue 
_influence, is not the will under consideration. The last 
will of Margaret Holten was not dated February 18, 
1959; it: was dated October 13, 1959, over seven months 
;if ter the earlier will was signed. This is a fact from 
which there is no escape. Furthermore, there is no escape 
from the fact that there is not one iota of evidence to 
connect either Bishop Buehner or Snyder with the exe-
cution of decedent's last will on October 13, 1959. Be-
cause of this fact the trial court properly ruled that be-
fore there could be any submission of the issue of undue 
influence to the jury because of any presumption which 
29 
may have attached to the earlier will, it was indispen-
sable for appellant to connect the same undue influence 
with respect to the later will. 
It is at this point that appellant's entire case for 
undue influence collapses. We have already demon-
strated why this is so, by the cases and authorities which 
have been cited and which will not be repeated at this 
point. 
There is an even more fundamental and basic reason 
why the appellant's claim of undue influence must fail. 
This is demonstrated clearly in the testimony of Pauline 
Hamilton, appellant's own witness, who was not associ-
ated with any will of decedent in any way and was wholly 
disinterested. Her testimony is a complete corroboration 
of what both Buehner and Snyder say occurred when 
Margaret Holten came to see them in February 1959, 
and stated to them her desire to leave her estate to the 
Church and not to her brother. It must be remembered 
that appellant's only complaint of error in this case is 
based upon an alleged continuing presumption of undue 
influence which, appellant argues, the trial court was 
bound to submit to the jury. Appellant clearly concedes 
that his whole case rests upon presumption and not 
upon evidence. 
Now, what did Pauline Hamilton say about what 
Margaret Holten had told her, long before she ever saw 
Buehner or Snyder, about what she intended to do with 
her estate? For years before her operation in March 
19 5 9, for a hysterectomy, she had told Pauline Hamilton 
that she was going to give her property to the Church 
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and this statement was made to Mrs. Hamilton by the 
decedent on several occasions. This is Pauline Hamil-
ton's testimony on direct examination by the appellant's 
own counsel: 
"Q. Now, calling your attention to the year 
1959 and to the conversations that you may or 
may not have had with her during that period, 
I would like to ask you if she talked to you about 
her hysterectomy operation. 
"A. Yes, she did. 
"Q. And did she talk to you during that pe-
riod of time about what she intended to do with 
her property in the event she died? 
"A. Well, she talked to me before she had her 
hysterectomy. 
"Q. How soon before? 
"A. Oh, it was-well, for years she told me how 
she wanted to dispose of her property. 
"Q. Would you relate if you can the conver-
sation that you had with her previous to her 
hysterectomy operation? 
"A. You mean just before her operation, shortly 
before? 
"Q. Shortly before her operation. 
"A. Well, shortly before her operation she said 
that she wanted the Church to be the beneficiary 
of whatever she had. (R. 196) 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Hamilton said: 
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"Q. And did Margaret Holten know that you 
were in that business? 
"A. Not at that time, not until I moved in 
Canyon Road, and then I discovered that she 
was dealing in contracts, discounted real estate 
contracts. 




"Q. -with you? 
"A And she said that's how she made her 
money and she was able to stay home and take 
care of her little Buddy. 
"Q. And did she make any suggestions to you 
about getting into that business? 
"A. Well, at one time she thought I was 
bright enough to go into that business, and she 
could probably teach me something about it. I 
became interested in anything that I could make 
money legally, and so I got three contracts from 
her, a total of three. They were not the best, but 
at least I got started. 
"Q. And did she teach you many things? 
"A. She taught me about real estate contracts, 
yes. That's how I got into the business. 
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"Q. And how to service the contracts? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And how to collect on them? 
"A. Yes. (R. 206) 
After Buddy died, Mrs. Holten discussed the dis-
position of her estate with Mrs. Hamilton. Mrs. Hamil-
ton had suggested to her that she leave her estate to a 
foundation for mentally defective children. Mrs. Holten 
repudiated this suggestion and on several occasions said 
the Church would get her property. (R. 200) 
The following testimony was given also on direct 
examination by appellant's counsel: 
.. Q. Now, did you inqu:ir~after this pa;rtic:-
ular conversation did you make any further in-
quiry as to what she had done with her property? 
"A. I couldn't care less what she did with 
it, but I do know that she mentioned several 
times that she was going to leave it to the Church. 
One time she said she would leave it to the 
Church, and then the Church could take care of 
her; and I said, 'Margaret, you are in no condition 
to have them take care of you now. You are able 
to take care of yourself,' and she said well, that's 
true, but she had been thinking about it." (R. 
200-201) 
.. * * * * 
"Mr. Frank Gustin: Would you repeat the ques-
tion? 
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"REPORTER: •Mrs. Hamilton, wasn't there 
an occasion of a conversation that you had with 
Margaret Holten when she mentioned that she 
had had a conversation with Viola Parkinson and 
that after that conversation with Viola Parkinson 
she had decided to leave her money to the 
Church? 
"A. Well, she had said so many times she 
would leave her money to the Church that I 
can't remember the relationship between Viola 
Parkinson and saying this. She may have done. 
I wouldn't be sure." (R. 202) 
Again on cross-examination, Mrs. Hamilton said: 
"Q. You mentioned in your testimony that she 
talked about her brother . 
.. A. Many times . 
.. Q. Many times. And what she desired to do 
with her property, she told you that-
.. A. Yes . 
.. Q. -Said that she wanted to leave it to the 
Church? 
.. A. Yes. 
"Q. And didn't want her brother to have it? 
«A. That's right." (R. 207) 
The courts have considered statements by a testator 
of his intentions made before the execution of his last 
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will on the issue or claim of undue influence. Appellant 
cities such a case in his brief-Longenecker v. Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church, 5 0 A. 244 (Pa., 1901). In that case 
it was, in effect, held that such declarations are to be 
given great consideration in connection with claims that 
undue influence procured the execution of a will. The 
count stated on page 246: 
"* >:· >:· There is no testimony m the case that 
Mr. Reist in any way induced, or attempted to 
induce, this old lady to do what is now made the 
subject of this complaint; on the contrary, it was 
shown by him that she often declared her inten-
tion of making some such gift." 
Undue influence in cases of this kind where it has 
been found to exist, has always persisted up until the 
death of the testator. The will of Margaret Holten was 
in her possession for three years after she made it and 
before she died. It was in her house under her control. 
If this document had been induced by undue influence 
it could have been changed after that influence was re-
moved. The fact that deceased retained this will in her 
possession and under her control for three years after it 
was executed is a circumstance of utmost importance to 
be considered in this case. It was found after her death 
locked in a steel cabinet in her home. (R. 87, 89) The 
fact that she did not destroy or change this will is further 
evidence that it represented her desires as to the dispo-
sition of her estate and further helps to nullify the con-
tention of a continuing undue influence. 
The record is uncontradicted that neither Snyder 
nor Buehner had any contact with Margaret Holten after 
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the earlier will was executed and had nothing whatever 
to do with the later one. (R. 137, 141, 142, 153) 
Appellant, in arguing for the proposition of a con-
tinuing undue influence, suggests, at page 3 3 of his brief, 
that the withdrawal of funds by decedent from her joint 
account in Tracy-Collins Bank is evidence of a paranoid 
reaction and a continuing undue influence exerted upon 
her. The statement is patently absurd and deserves little 
comment or consideration. It is pure speculation and 
conjecture, not based upon any evidence. There could 
be a hundred plausible explanations and in the absence 
of evidence one would merit no more consideration than 
another. 
In the face of testimony such as this, the claim that 
there is a presumption that the idea of leaving her prop-
erty to the Church was put into the mind of Margaret 
Holten and originated in the minds of Carl Buehner and 
Vernon Snyder vanishes like fog in the sun. The testi-
mony of both Snyder and Buehner, uncontradicted, sus-
tained, and corroborated by appellant's own witness, 
Pauline Hamilton, shows that when the last will was 
written by Margaret Holten she was adhering to a deci-
sion made by her, long before she met Buehner or Sny-
der, that her property when she died would go to the 
Church and not to her brother. 
Furthermore, the very fact that in her last will de-
cedent removed Carl Buehner as executor as named in 
her first will, is eloquent testimony of the fact that if he 
ever had any influence with her as to the disposition of 
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her estate, it disappeared sometime between February 18, 
1959, and October 13, 1959. 
VII THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT TESTATRIX HAD TESTA-
MENT ARY CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE 
EXECUTION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL. 
Appellant's final argument is on the issue of alleged 
testamentary incapacity. On that issue the burden of 
proof was on the appellant and never could be fixed to 
the respondents. On that issue, appellant was required 
to do more than make out a prima facie case. He had 
the burden of proving testamentary incapacity by the 
preponderance of the evidence. 
It is useless for appellant to assert or even to prove 
that the cause of decedent's death was a brain tumor 
from which she died on October 14, 1962, or that she 
had other infirmities and disabilites, or that she was a 
peculiar personality or could have been easily influenced 
through appeals to her religious belief, or that her attitude 
toward her brother was unnatural in that she imagined 
without justification that he did not care for her and 
was only interested in her money, or that she thought 
that he had tried to kill her on one occasion. Such 
matters are of no consequence unless it is shown that, 
by reason of these conditions, the testatrix was unable 
to recognize the natural objects of her bounty or to know 
and understand what property she owned and to form a 
plan for disposing of it by will. These are the only tests 
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of testamentary capacity which the law applies to a de-
termination of that fact. 
In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256 (1917), 
the Court stated at page 222: 
"It is upon instances similar to those just illus-
trated, and upon the facts that the testator was 
untidy in his personal habits and dress and at 
home, and that he had a miserly disposition and 
an entire lack of affection for his off spring, which 
were the principal grounds that induced the wit-
nesses to consider him of unsound mind. Indeed, 
the weight of the evidence is to the effect that 
they considered him so because he was unlike 
other men. He was not as they observed other 
men, and expressions of that character. The fact 
is that the evidence discloses eccentricities on the 
part of the testator which at times were induced 
and aggravated by the fact that the testator was 
afflicted with the physical infirmities of being 
deaf, of having some ailment of the throat and of 
the eyes. True, he has some other physical de-
fects, but those were of minor importance. Ec-
centricities and idiosyncracies, however gross, do 
not constitute insanity, and cannot incapacitate 
one otherwise sound from making a valid will. 
The finding of the jury that the testator was not 
insane at the time he made the will is not only 
supported by, but it is the only conclusion per-
missible under the evidence." (Emphasis added) 
In re Buttars' Estate, 123 Utah 596, 261 P. 2d 171 
(1953), the court stated at page 601: 
"* * * The evidence related above is proof that 
testatrix was eccentric in her actions and forget-
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fµl at times of some things, but is utterly in-
sufficient to sustain the contestants' burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
she lacked testamentary capacity at the time she 
executed the Will." 
A very enlightening case upon the effect of an ab-
normal personality, specifically, a testator alleged to have 
been a paranoid, is cited in appellant's brief (p. 3 8). 
This case is In re Hansen's Will, 52 Utah 554, 177 P. 982 
(1918), wherein this court stated at page 567-68: 
"Counsel for contestants do not claim that the 
testator. was generally insane, but contended 
'that he entertained beliefs respecting his chil-
dren, and respecting other people, and respecting 
his money and the disposition he should make 
thereof, which were without foundation in fact' 
and in the execution of his will he was the 'victim 
of' progressive paranoia, an incurable disease, 
which related to and influenced the provisions 
made for strangers and the exclusion of his chil-
dren. In other words, he was laboring under an 
insane delusion with regard to objects of his 
bounty. Counsel have cited no cases, nor author-
ity, and we think none can be found, where similar 
facts and circumstances as detailed by the con-
testants' witnesses were held to be sufficient to 
support a finding by either court or jury of 
mental incompetency to make a will." 
The court in conclusion stated at pages 570-71: 
"Upon what reasonable hypothesis may the 
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courts penetrate. the mind of this man and find 
that his was an 'unnatural will,' or treat the testi-
mony in this case as even tending to establish 
that he was controlled by an 'insane delusion' in 
the making of his will? If, under the record here, 
we are to sustain the contention of contestants, 
that we may not disturb the verdict of the jury in 
finding the will invalid, then, indeed, the civil 
right of making testamentary disposition of pro-
perty in this state is but as the will-o-the-wisp, 
and forever disappears upon the bald assertion 
of the medical expert that the individual who 
seeks to exercise the legal right to do so labored 
under an insane delusion, and that his eccentrici-
ties, habits, and conduct of life are conclusive of 
the fact. Such is not the law of wills." (Emphasis 
added) 
The above mentioned cases support the propos1t1on 
that peculiarities and idiosyncrasies and attitudes and 
hostility toward close relatives, even children, are no 
proof of mental incapacity to make a will. We have 
nothing in the record of this case more than some evi-
dence of these things which the cases all say will not 
support a finding of testamentary incapacity. 
The two experts who testified would not conclude, 
despite all of the entries of the diary and the physical 
infirmities of the deceased, that she did not retain suf-
ficient mental capacity to make a will on October 13, 
1959. If anyone could have given an opinion that Mar-
garet Holten was mentally incompetent, it was Dr. Hen-
rie and Dr. Bernson based upon the entries in her diary 
and upon the medical records introduced in evidence. 
They were furnished with information upon which their 
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expert knowledge could form a conclusion, assuming her 
·particular mental peculiarities and abnormalities and 
the effect of her physical infirmities upon her behavior. 
Dr. Henrie refused to voice any opinion that Margaret 
Holten had been unduly influenced in the making of 
her last or any will or that she was mentally incompetent 
to make a will. (R. 177, 178, 181, 183, 185) Dr. Bernson 
stated that if Margaret Holten had capacity to take care 
of her affairs, collect money, etc., a year before he saw her, 
she·probably was mentally competent at that time. (R. 
220, 222, 223) 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record in this case, there was ab-
solutely no evidence that the last will and testament of 
Margaret Schramm Holten was the product of undue 
influence exerted upon her on October 13, 1959, or that 
she, on that date, did not possess sufficient mental capacity 
to execute her last will and testament. On the contrary, 
the evidence is clear that she had testamentary capacity 
and that there was no undue influence. The record 
further shows that there could be no presumption of 
undue influence because the record is clear and uncon-
tradicted that Margaret Holten, long before she ever saw 
either Bishop Buehner or Vernon Snyder, had determined 
that she would leave her property to her church when she 
died and not to her brother. This being the state of the 
record when plaintiff rested, the trial court should have 
granted respondent's motion for a directed verdict at that 
time and should not even have required that respondents 
rest their case before granting such motion. It is sub-
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mitted, therefore, that the ruling of the trial court must 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By 
Albert R. Bowen 
Merlin 0. Baker 
on Brief 
CANNON, DUFFIN & PACE 
Attorneys for Respondents 
